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By and large, if we follow the current discussions on 
consciousness in the West we get two impressions. First, one 
gets to think that the understanding of consciousness is 
dependent on the understanding of, if not the brain, at least 
the physical processes guided by some mechanism and having 
the capabilities for replicating the phenomenon in vitro with 
the help of controlled experiments. Second, there is no 
consensual definition of the problem, method and the major 
goals of enquiry itself; and third there is insufficient recognition 
of the very com plexity and subjective nature of the 
phenomenon. All the three features have jointly contributed 
towards generating vast literature, dialogues and discussions 
about a variety of issues relating to consciousness, the primary 
one being empirical research and on medical possibilities, 
especially in the area of ‘abnormahties’.
1. Introduction
Binding experiences has been the singlemost issue in the center
of focus in the last decade of discussions on ‘consciousness’
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crossing disciplines: neurobiological, quantum mechanical, 
computational, theoretical, psychological etc. Though the 
details of what constitutes ‘experience’ differ by method and 
perspective, a consensus has emerged that (i) to explain 
‘consciousness’ is to explain ‘experience’; (ii) to explain 
experience is to explain its unity and binding nature. Following 
this preliminary consensus, however imphcit it is, many 
discussions took place/are taking place from the first, second 
and third-person perspectives, though main stream discussion 
is still dominated to a greater extent by third-person approaches.
Given the complexity of ‘experience’ as a phenomenon for 
investigation, or as involved in our understanding, it is helpful 
to look at alternative views about what constitutes an 
‘experience’. I hope to do this with the help of instances from 
Indian epistemology and Indian dramaturgy. I will be looking 
at two different traditions of thinking and experiencing: Indian 
epistemology in the classical systems of Indian thought and 
Indian dramaturgy as dealt with in the classical text Natya ^astra. 
By doing this I hope to em phasize the im portance of 
‘experience’ as lying in its nuances and juxtapose it with as it 
is conceptualized now in the ‘consciousness’ discussions 
(which is reduced to third-person physical data, deprived of 
first-person intimacy, and also the depth and breadth of 
meaning). The attem pt is to present the thesis that if 
consciousness cannot be understood without looking at 
‘experience’, experience certainly cannot be reduced for
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convenient reductive (physical, psychoanalytic and cultural) 
methods of understanding but will have to be open for a variety 
of meanings validated from first-person perspectives. This will 
definitely take away the reductive scientific monopoly of 
explaining consciousness in a singular way, but will encourage 
scientific methods to reexamine the normative criteria for ‘truth’ 
and ‘reality’.
2. The One Puzzle
I think there is an interesting and serious change taking pla;e 
in the current discussions on consciousness. This turn is based 
on and com pelled  by the in trac tab le  re la tionsh ip  of 
‘consciousness’ with ‘experience’. The nearest empirical idea 
for the unity and subjective nature of consciousness is 
‘experience’. Hence the scientific focus on ‘experience’. The 
interesting part of discussions is that though there is a 
recognition of experience as vital in the study of consciousness, 
the attempt itself is to strip ‘experience’ of the qualities which 
would make it of experiential nature (unitary and subjective) 
and study it on the basis of empirical standards such as causal 
connections, neural influences, neural locations etc. I am not 
suggesting that brain research is not needed or even that it is 
of small importance. Certainly, it is very significant in its own 
right. Buf if our guidelines and methods are not based on our 
basic premise to study consciousness (experience, which is 
unitary and subjective) then we certainly cannot make a claim
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that brain studies, apart from giving new knowledge about 
brain functions, would also lead to a complete theory of 
consciousness. The puzzle in the current discussions on 
consciousness is that of the persistent conflict between 
epistemology and phenomenology.
If we look at the major semantic trends in the current 
discussions, views that are discussed and debated do not any 
more fall into the classical division of reductionistic and non- 
reductionistic, or empirical and non-empirical approaches. 
However third-person the approach is, when it comes to the 
descriptive definition of consciousness, the ideas are based 
on qualitative features of consciousness. The discussions on 
empathy', meaning^, m em e\ and mirror neurons'* are some 
instances. On the other side, the growing amount of discussions 
on meditation^ and altered states of consciousness'’ give third- 
person references, however subjective the discussed experience 
is. A possible reason for this trend to interrelate and bridge 
first-person experience and third-person definition is the 
recognition of a distinct characteristic of ‘consciousness’, 
namely, that it is not completely defined by empirical standards 
or completely understood by first-person experienced
3. Self and Meaning___________________________
The extent of the meanings imputed to ‘consciousness’ most 
often crosses empirical hmits and sometimes even diffuses with
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qualitative experiential descriptions. The one major problem 
in consciousness studies is the semantics of ‘consciousness’. 
Unfortunately this prominent meta analysis of the discussions 
is dismissed in recent discussions\ It is very important that 
there be not only a well-laid out definition for the problem 
but also a methodological consistency. This does not mean 
that even before the enquiry a complete theory of consciousness 
is postulated. To have the semantics of consciousness given 
importance at the start itself means that the theory will not be 
drawn based on the hmitations of the methods, but on the 
original contention about ‘consciousness’.
What exactly are we trying to understand by the study of 
consciousness? The answ ers could range from neural 
functions to subjective experience. It is again interesting to 
see that the meanings we give to ‘consciousness’ are wider 
conceptually than the strict semantic (in current discussions) 
definition of consciousness. This is even clear at the starting 
point of discussion when the immediate reference is to 
‘experience’.
It is in this context, that I wish to juxtapose the idea of ‘self 
as an alternative to the discussions on ‘consciousness’. The 
w ord ‘se lf’ is m ore com prehensive  than  the w ord 
‘consciousness’ since it includes connotations at different levels 
of experience and also of the subjective identity which is 
important to understand the unity of experience.
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The discussion about consciousness is discussion about 
experience. The discussion about experience is discussion 
about the ‘self. ‘Experience’ and ‘self certainly relate to 
something which is more than what is happening in the brain, 
more than abnormal conditions, more than ordinary conditions, 
more than transcendental states.’
4. Indian Thinking
There are two key ideas in classical Indian philosophical 
thinking which strike the attention of any student. These are 
‘atma ’ and ‘darsana These words perform a major double 
function, which is also the distinctive feature of the whole of 
Indian th ink ing , of com bining ep istem ology  and 
phenomenology. For this reason, ‘atma’ could mean either 
the ‘self that is engaged in a particular act, or the self which 
is untouched by any act; ‘darsana’could mean either reahstic 
perception or intuitive thinking. The basic reason for such a 
foundational trend in the whole of Indian philosophical thinking 
goes beyond the felicity of a strict structural language (Sanskrit). 
It is an attempt not to break, and defme, the ‘self into identities 
based  on the con tex t; experience into o rd inary  and 
extraordinary; at the same time give thinking and understanding 
a depth which is inclusive and open-ended but not divisive 
and hierarchical.
What constitutes darsana and what does not
Before I get to the details of the epistemology of darsana, I 
will briefly look at what constitutes darsana, and what does 
not. The word ‘darsana’connoic?, the philosophical enterprise 
to think and to delve with ideas so as to:
(i) ascertain what is true knowledge,
(ii) to understand new ideas, and,
(iii) to understand the nature of the enquirer himself.
JiTana is a complex concept in classical Indian thinking. It not 
only refers to logical and epistemological methods and answers 
but also to states of mind which are important in the discussion 
about the primal nature of self. Hence, the discussions on jiiana 
and pramana are always interrelated to understanding ethical, 
axiological, aesthetic and spiritual issues. There is a constant 
attempt to reconcile and integrate different experiences, and 
the existence of contradictions so as to generate worldviews 
based on an understanding of life with answers for fundamental 
questions about self-identity, nature of world, creation, 
purpose of life, value systems etc. There is widespread criticism 
that darsana does not have Ideological value and does not 
extend its scope for change and modification. This perception 
might have been influenced by the complex method used by 
the schools using a variety of epistemological tools such as 
metaphors, imageries and stories, as equally valid, along with 
logical analysis, anticipating counterpositions and affiliation 
to definite theories of what constitutes right knowledge. Not
B in d in g  Experiences f o r  a F irs t -Person  A pp ro a ch
Strictly adhering to a definite pattern of enquiry could lead to 
the thinking that what is offered is a closed philosophical 
position to save the proponent and the follower of that 
particular tradition. What the darsanakara-s are interested in 
is to give a new place for emerging ideas in the worldview 
and allow a new understanding, crossing structural rigidity in 
thinking. Clearly, what is not the feature of darsana is an 
empirical haste to explain away things.
4.1 Epistemology of Darsana 
Epistem ological openness
Indian epistemology is constituted by complexes more than 
singular concepts. I will list a few such complexes, without 
going into the technical details, to demonstrate that Indian 
epistemology is an open-ended and integral enterprise.
Guidelines for discourse
Concepts and categories are vital to any kind of discourse. 
The school that perfected the art of discourse in Indian thinking 
was Nyaya. Tarkasamgraha which is the foundational text of 
logic and discourse, is also the text followed, for that reason, 
by later schools in developing their own theories. What makes 
Tarkasamgraha so very interesting and foundational is the way 
in which it defines and elucidates the necessary components 
for a discourse from both the epistemological and subjective 
points of view. Both definition (laksana) of an entity or idea, 
and the guidelines for discourse [anubandha catustaya) are
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discussed with equal importance in the text. The meaning of 
the world tarJca is also specific, in that it does not imply a 
pure logical analysis but a complex activity of discourse guided 
by strict definitions and goals so as to have “ ....a compendious 
elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other 
ontological categories...” "*
There are sixteen padartha-?, which one studies in order to 
m aster Nyaya d ia lectics. A padartha  is defined as a' 
“ ...knowable thing (jneya) or as a validly cognizable thing 
(prameya) or as a nam eable or denotable thing which 
corresponds to a word (abhidheya)}^ These categories are 
means of knowledge (pramana), objects of valid knowledge 
(prameya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), instances 
(drstanta), established conclusions (siddhanta), members of 
syllogism (avayava), analysis (tarka), decisive knowledge 
(nirnaya), arguing for truth (vada), arguing contructively as 
well as destructively for victory (j^lpa), destructive argument 
(vitanda), fallacious reasons (hetvabhasa), quibbling (cala), 
specious and unavailing objections (jati), and vulnerable 
standpoints (nighrahasthana)}^ The discussion on padartha is 
an elaborate one in classical thinking.
The concept of ‘definition’ (laksana) i?, another complex, which 
according to Nyaya tells what an entity ‘is’ by saying what it
‘is not’. Definition is “ .....not merely an explication of the
connotation of a term; but it is a proposition specifying the
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differentia or the differentiating feature of the species or the 
thing defined” .'-̂  Laksana is defined as a specific feature 
(asadharana dharma) which is free from the three faults of a 
definition such as over-applicability (ativyapti), partial 
inapplicability (avyapti) dXid. total inapplicability (asambhava). 
A definition is faulty by ativyapti when it refers to certain 
qualities which are characteristic of the entity defined as well 
as of something not intended to be defined. A definition is 
faulty by avyaptiV'/he.n the definition does not refer to some of 
the characteristic features of the entity defined. A definition is 
faulty by asambhava when the definition refers to qualities 
which are totally non-characteristic of the entity defined.
Guidelines for teleology
Another important complex which is considered in almost all
schools of Indian thinking is the notion of anubandha catustaya
(four fold preliminaries) though this is well-specified as a part
of dialectics in Taricasamgraha. The four-fold preliminaries for
any discourse are visaya (theme of discourse), prayojana (major
goal), sambandha (relation between the theme of discussion
and the treatise), and adhiicari (for whom a discourse is
d esigned ).T he  trend of specifying the objective and subjective
guidehnes of a discourse is also found in the foundational
texts of Vedanta and Mimamsa. The starting verse of the text
specifies the nature of enquiry such as for brahman, dharma
etc.''’ The defining characteristic of a discourse clarifies any
doubt which may ensue later in the discourse about what the
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discourse is guided by. The thematic specification of the 
discourse also helps the student to have a clear picture about 
what the discourse will not talk about or to what theme it will 
be restricted to. Even if the theme of the discourse is given 
prior to entering the discourse the discussion could at some 
point raise the question of teleology in the mind of student. 
Hence the theme as well as the purpose of a discussion on 
such a theme is specified initially. Though it could be a m eta­
question outside the scope of the discourse it is essential also 
to anticipate at least to some extent the relation between the 
discourse and the theme of the discourse itself which would 
enable the understanding of how far the treatise or discourse 
is representative of the theme. The final and the most important 
prehminary factor for any discourse is to specify who is 
qualified to enter into such a discourse. This is a major rule 
for meta-discourse, which I think, is almost forgotten in the 
current discussions on a complex theme like ‘consciousness’. 
The recognition of the aptitude of the person as playing a vital 
role in the success of discourse and understanding implies the 
subjective factor involved in epistemological enterprises. It also 
implies that understanding is always finally related to the basic 
aptitude of the student, which once again anticipates the 
essential relation between epistemology and phenomenology, 
knowledge of something and experience. One instance of 
expounding the nature of adhikari cou\d be seen in the primal 
text of Advaita ‘Tattvabodha’ Sankaracarya talks about 
‘sadhana catustaya
B in d in g  Experiences f o r  a F ir s t -Person  A p proach
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Guidelines for validation
The issue of validation (pramanya) is a very important complex 
extensively dealt with by the schools of Indian thinking. The 
discussion on vahdating knowledge ranges from theories of 
knowledge to theories of reality. The word ‘pram ana’ 
etymologically means ‘means of measurement’ or ‘that which 
produces know ledge’. T h e  concept of pramana though 
initially interpreted as a theory of knowledge, of ascertaining 
knowledge, its function is not completely understood without 
taking into consideration two of the characteristic features of 
pramana as perceived by most of the classical schools of Indian 
thinking. These two characteristics ‘abhadhitatva’, of non­
contradiction, and ‘anadhigatatvaof novelty, lays down the 
condition for validating knowledge."* It is not possible to 
validate a statement to be true or false if there is another 
knowledge statem ent which contradicts the claim of the 
previous statem ent. Being non contradicted by another 
statement alone does not perform the role for vahdation. The 
characteristic of non-contradiction is also to be followed by 
the feature of novelty. Discovery of new knowledge is as 
important as ascertaining of it. Vahdation also has to look 
into the possibility of newness whether it is epistemological 
or ontological. The feature of ‘novelty’ imphes once again the 
epistemological openness evident in Indian thought.
A major distinction in the Indian theories of knowledge is
regarding the position on the origin (utpatti) anA ascertainment
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of validity (jnapti). The validity of a cognition is decided, in 
some schools, by the presence of certain characteristics 
intrinsic to know^ledge, and in some other schools, by the 
presence of certain characteristics extrinsic to knowledge. 
Following the same lines of thinking, the two positions about 
invalidity of knowledge are that it is decided by extrinsic 
characteristics or intrinsic characteristics. Vahdity itself is 
ascertained in some schools by its very intrinsic nature 
(svatapramanah), and in others by its extrinsic nature 
(paratapramanah).
Two paradigm s
There are two paradigms in the classical schools, inspite of 
the differences in their metaphysical and epistemological 
positions. These are (i) what we see and experience, which is 
constituted by the given and the immanent, (ii) what we can 
see and experience which is constituted by the possibilities 
and the transcendent. It is within these two paradigms that the 
elaborate and detailed discussion on fundamental experiences 
such as pain and pleasure, sorrow and happiness, selfishness 
and selflessness, freedom and bondage, the given and the 
possible etc. takes place. Darsana is an attempt to bridge the 
seemingly two contradictory paradigms through an exploration 
of the self based on systematic discussions on (i) theoretical,
(ii) experiential, and (iii) transcendental issues.
Bi7iding Experiences  f o r  a F irs t -P erson  A p p ro a ch
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What falls under theoretical issues
Theoretical problems are envisaged by the building of tools 
for th ink ing  such as ab s trac tio n , genera liza tion  and 
conceptualization guided by the question of meaning, certainty 
and new knowledge. The factorization of ‘new knowledge’ in 
epistemology gives importance to intuitive thinking all through 
the discussion. A general division can be made of the theories 
the darsanakara-s debate on, such as:
(i) theory of what is given: which relates to ontological 
questions about the nature of the world, the nature of 
the self, the nature of life and death,
(ii) theory of the what and how of knowledge which relates 
to epistemological questions about meaning and vahdity,
(iii) theory of what is beyond the given (if any) which relates 
to metaphysical and teleological questions about the 
nature of God, the nature of ultimate causes, the nature 
of self and the nature of reality,
(iv) theory of spiritual, mental and physical disciplines which 
relates to questions about ethical issues, value systems, 
duty, responsibility, selfishness, transcendences and new 
perceptions about self-identity.
U
4.2  Experience of Darsana 
M etaphysical openness
If we examine the classical schools of Indian thought, we find
that though each scchool allows elaborate discussion on the
epistemology of its philosophy, the foundational thought is
metaphysical. But the metaphysical foundation is not to be
mistaken for dogmatic and closed ideas. The metaphysical
openness of ideas is evident from the fact that they are based
on certain teleological assumptions. Discussions on the nature
of (self) is juxtaposed with physical (as in Carvaka system),
ethical or spiritual guidelines as in almost all schools. To
understand the given nature of self and its transcendent
possibilities the understanding of self is important. The key
feature of such an understanding is that it is not an
epistemological exegesis but a first-person phenomenological
examination. The concept of jnana is a complex concept and
is not to be merely translated as ‘knowledge’ as we understand
it in popular fashion. The discussion on the familiar/given
and the transcendent self (jiva and Mma) is guided by the
continuous and rigorous distinguishing of the one from each
other at every instance of experiencing. The conflict between
the near and famihar/given nature or self, and the distant and
transcendent nature of self forms the focus of attention for the
darsana. The attempt of darsana is to solve the conflict in such
a manner that the duals involved in it are integrated rather
than segregated. The idea of liberation hence is not a singular
event in time but a constant understanding and experiencing
15
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of the complexity of the contradiction of the given and the 
transcendental. The distinguishing of the atma and anatma (the 
real nature and the given nature of self), atma anatma vyaparah, 
is the singlem ost exposition for which the rest of the 
epistemological, ethical and phenomenological theories are 
expounded. It is the metaphysical openness which is the 
hallmark of Indian thinking.
Spiritual an d ontological openness
In recent discussions the word ‘spiritual’ has gained new
meanings, many of which emphasize the role of personal
growth, ecological aw areness, em pathy, intersubjective
transactions, emotional well-being, efficiency in expressions,
creative living. The distinct feature of the philosophical
traditions of Indian thinking is its spiritual openness, by which
I mean, not just a liberal philosophy, but the facility to integrate
new experience and new understanding into an evolving
scheme of ideas, all leading and pointing to self-exploration.
The ideal of spiritual living is given foremost importance rather
than moral and epistemological theories. It is not to say that
the ethical guidelines and practices are less important in these
traditions but to suggest that all such theories and discussions
are addressed from a spiritual platform which discuss the nature
of self and the world of experience and the relationship
between them. Liberation is the key concept however radically
different the guidelines suggested for it by different schools
are. Identity and self are the key problems addressed to with
16
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the help of metaphysical positions, epistemological theories and 
ethical guidelines. The breadth and length of discussions in 
darsana is interestingly just not different discussions on what 
exactly the nature of self is, but mutually reinforcing dialogues 
on the consensus view that all discussions are to be guided by 
the coordinating concept of ‘self. Invariably the discussions in 
darsana are those leading from the recognition of ‘self and 
‘identity’ as larger categories for thinking. It could be for this 
reason that epistemology (tarka) does not have the supremacy 
in deciding the course of events and validation, but only with 
equal participation of reflective thinking (vicara)m discourse. 
Analytical thinking can deliver its goods only if it is accompained 
by reflective (vicara)zsiA intuitive (nidhidhyasana)
What falls under experiential and transcendental issues
An interesting characteristic in the classical systems of Indian
thinking is the overriding issue above all issues to connect
and catapult from what would be considered the given to what
is possible. The concept about experience is not strictly about
what is caused by an extraneous factor/s but what is possible
by the distinctive and unique nature of the individual.
Therefore, experience is not merely a theme for understanding
based on its immediate context such as cause, or results, but
a tool for further exploration of the self. The ordinariness and
extra-ordinariness of an experience is understood from the
standpoint of the self rather than from the standpoint of its
causes. This trend also impels the understanding of the self
17
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along with the understanding of the object of experience. The 
object of experience, the result of experience and the 
experiencer constitute the triad of the complex phenomenon 
of experience, each of which is significant in the understanding 
of the other.
The major experiential issues which are discussed in the 
classical schools are also interconnected with the major 
transcendental issues. Thus the experience and understanding 
of pain and pleasure are connected with guidelines for 
transcending pleasure and pain; experience and understanding 
of freedom and bondage are connected with the guidelines for 
transcending self-identities and rigid perceptions about the 
context; and, experience and understanding of different states 
of mind are connected with the guidehnes for transcending 
words, verbal structres and attributed meanings.
Junctions and m eeting poin ts
Junctions and meeting points between the discussions on
theoretical, experiential and transcendental issues are quite
unique to darsana. For instance, ethical and spiritual discipline
is necessary for new experiences and knowing self differently;
knowledge of self could change the way the nature of the given
is understood; knowledge of self could reorient experience;
knowledge of self could allow for new responses to the
situation/context. What distinguishes the Indian way of thinking
from what we call today the Western way of thinking, is the
18
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curious connection present in darsana between theoretical, 
experiential and transcendental issues. It is also this 
distinguishing feature of Indian thinking which is often 
misrepresented as ‘mystic’ and ‘other-worldly’. The important 
point missed here is that we fail to recognize the fact that 
what interested Indian thinking was not the linearity and 
immediate availability of rigid structures of knowledge but an 
open-endedness where experience and reflection could 
together bring about the re-orientation of how we construe 
our self-identities and how we respond to the given.
The foundational issues, crossing the rigidity of being 
theoretical, experiential or transcendental, which are embedded 
in the darsana are (i) about the human mind, consciousness 
and experience, and (ii) about self-identity. The guidelines for 
the exploration of these embedded issues are (i) abstraction: 
to identify the unitary in the discrete, (ii) placeability: to have 
an ontological meaning for any experience, its object and its 
experiencer, (iii) practise: to have values and discipline as 
essential guidelines for self-exploration.
5, Indian Dramaturgy
The foundational text of Indian dramaturgy is ‘Natya ^astra ’
authored by Bharatamuni. The available form of the text
comprises 5600 verses coupled with prose, though the original
version is said to have had more than 30,000 verses. It is a
19
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complete treatise on Indian dance, drama and music. The text 
has an exhaustive thematic structure since it deals with a 
complex conception of drama (natya) constituted by what 
could be described as objective and subjective features. There 
is e la b o ra te  d iscu ssio n , on the one hand , on the  
characteristics of playhouses, different kinds of plays, different 
and complex gestures and movements, rules of prosody, metres 
and music, uses of language, styles of characters, costumes 
and ornaments. On the other hand, there are discussions on 
emotions and mental states which are their causes, mutuality 
of emotions and mental states, rapport between actor and 
spectator, mental and physical nature of actors and spectators, 
preliminary mystic rituals for effective representation and final 
goals of drama. At the same time there is a structural rigidity 
as to the epistemological structure, and openness about the 
subjective expression, relationship between the actor and the 
spectator, goals of drama etc.
The complexity of the text can be seen at three levels;
(i) in addressing the representation of different kinds of 
characters (mostly mythical) with different states of minds 
through a joint participation of physical gesture and 
m ovem ents, mental states and emotions, ritualistic 
prehminaries, costumes, music and space configuration,
(ii) in addressing the unique relationship between the actor
and the spectator, of the actor invoking a specific state
of emotion in the spectator’s mind, and
20
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(iii) in making possible a spontaneous and self evolving 
nature of enjoyment for the audience in spite of the 
structured and specified composition.
The rigorous and specified rules of nat^ya together with the 
integral approach to emotions, first-person experience of 
the actor and the spectator make Natya ^astra an insightful 
treatise as well as what can be conceived of as belonging 
to a higher order of cognition and experience, namely a 
wholesome representation of human emotions through a 
complcx act of the external body (physical body gestures, 
costumes, music and plot) and the spiritual body (emotions, 
states of mind and unique relationship between the one 
who is presenting the re-representation and the one who is 
enjoying it).
5.1 Epistemology of Natya
The word ‘na tya’ does not have a one-w ord English 
equivalent. Before we get to the meaning of ‘natya’ \X is 
important to keep in mind the distinction between ‘natya 
nrtta and nrtya (natya nrtya nrtta vivekahp  which is the 
introductory theme discussed in Natya Sastra. Nalya is a 
combination of nrtya (acting) and nrtta (dance). Nrtya is the 
visual and pantomimic representation of emotions and ideas. 
Nrtta refers to movements of the body with gestures which 
are regulated by tala (musical and interval). Though the text 
continues to give a complex definition of what constitutes
21
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natya the categorical statement made about it is that natya 
has primarily to do with rasa}^ Later natya is explained 
using two key ideas which are abhinaya and bhava. Natya 
means visual representation (abhinaya) in its fourfold forms 
such as using parts of the physical body (angika), verbal 
utterances (vacika), costumes and ornaments (aharya) diwd. 
physical signs of mental states (satvika)}^
Poise o f expression
Abhinaya is defined as the expression, through the actor, of 
the meaning of the words of a literary (poetical) work with the 
help of vibhava (emotions and states of mind physically 
represented) so as to invoke an uninterrupted flow of rasa 
(enjoyment) for the audience. The scope of abhinaya is 
extended beyond the rigidity of planned gestures and emotions 
by differentiating it to be of two distinct types: lokadharmi 
and natyadharmi. Lokadharmi represents the objects and 
characters as they are portrayed in the mythical literature, and 
natyadharmi represents the objects and characters through 
suggestive movements from the setting of stage. An example 
of natyadharmi is a suggestive movement of the eye or 
suggestive gesture by the hands to indicate something else 
through the imagination of the spectator.
The fulfillment of natya is achieved through the effective and 
joint perfomance of differnt kinds of abhinaya and mudra 
(representation of objects, emotions and ideas through single
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hand and combined hand gestures), the theme of the play, music 
and involvement of the spectators. The role of spectators is 
considered to be an active event that mutually influences the 
performance of the actor in terms of the representation of feelings.
It is not directly relevant to this paper to describe the technical 
details of the themes of various chapters of the text. But it is 
necessary to keep in mind during the ensuing discussion that 
the elaborate description in the text mainly follows two patterns;
(i) discussion and detailed description of the different kinds 
of gestures of different parts of the body and their nuances, 
different kinds and features of plays and poetry, kinds of 
metres, characteristics of the actors, judges and spectators, 
use of languages, costumes and ornaments, and different 
kinds of musical instruments,
(ii) discussion and description of rasa (emotions) and b/iava 
(mental states which produce emotions), the mental rapport 
between the actor and the spectator, the types of characters 
and mental and physical temperaments suitable for their 
portrayal, the goals of drama and how they are fulfilled; 
and preliminary rituals and settings to invoke a conducive 
environment before the start of natya.
The concept of natya evolves in the text through the
development of both the above patterns which I would like to
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describe as third-person and first person approaches. The 
prescribed set of rules for abhinaya exists along with the 
spontaneity of the actor in representing the structured, and in 
evoking the rasa in the spectator. The visual and the character- 
oriented together with the subjective and self-oriented produces 
an aesthetic experience which could be further described as a 
spiritual experience. The act of representation, the preliminary 
settings and rituals etc. are connected with the cosm<?gony 
that the physical world is the angika abhinaya of ^iva, the 
world of language is his vacika abhinaya, the universe consists 
of his aharya abhinaya and ultimate happiness itself is his 
satvika abhinayaP The complexity of representing human 
emotions and at the same time invoking empathy in the 
spectator is brought out through natya in a comprehensive 
m anner using a rigorous epistemology and first-person 
experience for both the actor and the spectator.
5.2 Experience of Natya
Natya, though presented following a structured design about
it through the portrayal of characters, in its primary nature is
experiential and first-person-oriented. This is evidenced by
the detailed discussion on rasa, bhava and preksakatva. The
word natya has its origin from the root ‘naf’which means ‘to
act’. Nata is one who performs the act through different styles
of abhinaya. Natya is the art of ‘nata’}^ The importance given
to natya as a dramatic art has its origins in the ‘act’ itself of
the actor. It is the nata who is responsible for natya and not
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vice versa. This is a significant feature since it emphasises the 
first-person-oriented approach to a complex event such as 
natya.
Tasting the flavour
Rasa is a complex concept which is the central idea on which
the experience of natya is founded. The word rasa is variously
translated as ‘rehsh’, ‘enjoyment’^̂  and related to mean the
object of relish or the feehng of rehsh itself According to
Bharatamuni rasa emerges out of the combining of three basic
components such as vlbhava, anubhava and vyabhicari. They
are also (karana, karya and sahakari) the determ inant,
consequent and auxiliary conditions of rasa. All three taken
together comprise the sthayibhava which is directly responsible
for the production of rasa. Bhava is that which makes
something happen.^* In Natya ^astra bhava is used as a
technical word to relate to the mental states as responsible for
producing rasa for the spectator through a combination of
kinds of (abhinaya) gc&txircs. Whether rasa is produced through
bhava or vice versa or whether they are mutually influenced is
a debate which is prominent in the literature on Natya ^astra
by various commentators. For the discussion in this paper, I
will deal only with the detailed presentation of kinds of rasa
and bhava, one instance of abhinaya which is that of eyes
(dhrsti), and nature of effectiveness of natya (natya siddhi
nirupana), to show the importance given to the nuances and
details of mental states, basic nature of experience and their
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physical representations, with an attempt to give a third-person 
account of first-person experience.
Bharata enlists eight rasas as the primary rasa-s^^ and a total 
of forty-nine b/iava-s which are classified as sthayibhava (eight 
in number), vyabhicaribhava (thirty-three in number) and 
satvikabhava (eitht in number). This classification refers to an 
evolution of mental states from its intense and pure states 
(sthayi), to manifestation of the pure states in feelings and 
leading them to rasa (vyabhicari), and to their physical signs 
(satvika). Another classification is of the cause and effect of 
bbava such as vibhava and anubhava respectively. The 
sthayibhava of soka is produced by the vibhava such as 
seperation from the beloved, loss of dear ones and assets etc. 
^okais represented by the anubhava such as tears, deep sighs 
etc. It is the sthayibhava which plays the key role in creating 
the rapport between the actor and spectator through the 
production of rasa.
Bharata enlists eight fundamental sthayibhava, thirty-three 
vyabhicaribhava, eight sMvikabhava and eight ras^^ according 
to the sthayibhav^"' (See Appendix 1 and Note 30.)
Through the corner o f the eye
Expression through the physical body, angika abhinaya, is
further classified into that falling under three types such as (i)
sariraja (bodily), (ii) mukhaja (facial), and (iii) cestakrta
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(through movements). There is another division of 3nga and 
upanga. Anga constitutes the abhinaya through head, hand, 
chest, sides, hips and feet. Upanga constitute abhinaya through 
eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips, cheeks and chin. The one instance 
of abhinaya through upanga that I will hst here in detail is that 
of dhrsti (glances) since these are considered to be more 
visually representative of the rasa.
What I wish to imply through this listing is, the analysis and 
observation given to the detailed study of empirical features of 
the inner mental states and feelings belonging to another person 
as represented by the actor. The two levels of third-person 
reporting and first-person experience are interesting to note at 
this point. Through the bhavabhinaya the actor represents the 
feelings of a person in a particular state of mind through the 
larger setting of stage, space, costumes and gesture (first instance 
of third-person reporting), and all the while undergoes the same 
state of mind so that the corresponding rasa is conveyed to the 
spectator (second level of third-person reporting). The enactment 
of the feelings is based on an understanding of the bhava (pure 
states of mind) and identifying with them (second level of first- 
person experience) which was earlier experienced by another 
person (first level of first-person experience).
The glances which total thiry-six in number are of two kinds:
(i) rasadhrsti, representative of the kind of rasa (rehsh), and
(ii) bhavadhrsti, representative of the kind of bhava (pure state
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of mind). Apart from the d/irst/ there is a detailed description 
of the kinds of movements of the pupils, eyelids, and also 
eyebrows.’' Eight kinds of rasadhrsti are described^^ (See 
Appendix 2 and Notes 33-72.)
Twilight space o f  the rea l and the virtual
Bhava and rasa are the two key concepts according to Bharata. 
Though he considers natya to be effective as a result of 
perform ance, he makes a detailed analysis of how the 
performance which is not realistic and identical with the world 
of reality for both the actor and spectator is made real in a 
virtual manner. The sthayibhava enVisitd are pure states which 
can exist and together with vyabhicaribhava and satvikabhava 
produce the necessary anubhava, only if the actor can identify 
with the sthayibhava. The performance of the character is 
dependent on this preliminary identification of the actor with 
the state of mind of the role which is portrayed. The sthayibhava 
are made to exist (bhavayantiiti bhavah)hy the actor so that 
they will be produced in the mind of the spectator (bhavanti 
iti bhavah) to produce the related rasa. The sthayibhava 
together with rasa could be considered as causing self­
transcendence for the actor as well as the spectator, and 
complex cognitive structures for both the actor and the 
spectator to be in communion in space where both transcend 
their self-identify. It is an enactment (by the actor through natya) 
which is spontaneous rather than the simple mimicry of an 
event or object. It is at one time physical and transcendental.
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One of the unique features of natya is that the epistemological 
and the e x p e rien tia l, the  theo ry  and tech n iq u e  are 
coordinated to form a mutually benefiting factor of the whole. 
Though the source of the following text is not authentically 
traced , it is said in both  Natya ^astra  and la te r in 
Natyadarpana, and is also popular as the synoptic definition 
of natya, that ‘the body should follow the tune, the hands 
must explain the meaning, eyes must speak the emotion and 
the feet must beat the time-measure; where the hands go 
there should go the eye, because where the eye goes the 
mind goes there with it, where the mind goes follows there 
the mental state, and where the mental state is there the 
feeling is.’  ̂ These two verses represent the coordinated 
physical, mental and transcendental nature of natya. Equal 
importance is given to detailed and specific physical and 
mental factors involved, and each of their transcendences is 
specified, at the same tim e, to broaden the scope of 
experience both for the actor and the spectator.
The m etanarrative
That natya is taken a wholesome event is evident from the
fact that apart from the detailed account of the current of natya
Bharata also devotes separate chapters^'* for examining the
effectiveness of natya (natya siddhi nirupana), describing in
detail the nature of actors, judges and spectators, and
explaining the goals of natya. There is even a mention about
the seating arrangement to be followed.”  It might be keeping
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the complex nature of natya that Bharata enlists for male and 
female characters; (i) three classes of personality (uttama, 
adhama and madhyama prakrti), and, (ii) the kinds of roles 
they could play.^*
The spectator of natya is not a passive recipient, but a preksaka, 
‘one who views in a unique manner’. It is evident that Bharata 
included the active and important participation of the spectator 
for natya to be a successful enterprise. There is a List of physical 
representations of the responses of the spectator to natya by 
making certain words’ ,̂ sounds^*, and physical and facial 
expressions.^^ There is also a description about who is a 
genuine spectator (preksaka). He who “ ... has unruffled 
senses, is pure, clever in discussing and weighing pros and 
cons, devoid of faults and fond of merits. He who attains 
gladness on seeing another glad, sorrow on seeing another 
so rry  and ex p erien ces  w re tch e d n ess  on seeing  the  
wretchedness of another is considered fit to be a spectator... “  
It is also said that all these quaUties may not be present in one 
single individual, but that different individuals as spectators 
could have them and together experience effective appreciation 
of the natya.
The goals of natya pertain to both objective and subjective
features. Through the composite of external and physical
enactm ent, and subjective states cf mind and feelings
representative of them, what is achieved for the (i) actor and
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(ii) spectator are; For the spectator, at the secondary level 
an appreciation of the characters and the theme, and at the 
primary level a temporary detachment from his/her self-identity 
is experienced. For the actor, at the primary level it is the 
complex task of representing a character, an idea or a nuance 
of a particular feeling through abhinaya and producing the 
corresponding rasa for the preksaka. At the secondary level, a 
temporary detachment from his/her self-identity and identity 
with the particular character’s self as a whole and with the 
various mental states that the character would have in the story 
narrated. The transcendence experienced by the actor is both 
transphysical and transmental since there is a combined use 
of body and mind. The transcendence experienced by the 
spectator is transmental.
A nd finally i t  is  experience and transcendence
For both the actor and the spectator it is a complex experience 
since there is a co-existence of his/her own dominant and 
real self-identity with the mental states of the character 
portrayed. It is this co-existence, of the real self-identities of 
the actor and the spectator, and the identities with ‘another- 
se lf , which determines the effectiveness of natya. The 
interesting and intriguing feature is the existence of a 
contradiction. For the effective transference of a particular 
bhava to the spectator the actor has to have an identity formed 
with it, transcending the artificiality of enacting it. At the same 
time, the actor has to be detached from any specific bhava of
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the character since what he/she is primarily concerned with is 
the narration of the story. The actor has to play the twin roles of 
being ‘the character portrayed’ and also ‘the narrator of the 
story’. It is this twin and contradictory role played by the actor 
which enables the spectator to have the experience of rasa which 
also involves an interesting contradiction. Unless the spectator 
can be one with the mental state of the character portrayed he/ 
she will not be able to appreciate the story and the specific 
nuance. At the same time unless a continuous detachment is 
maintained he/she will not be able to integrate the experience 
of that nuance in relation to his/her self-identity.
6. Re-Placing consciousness (In Indian thought)
By presenting two different instances of epistemology and 
experience from darsana and nMya, what I wish to suggest is 
that:
(i) contrary to the very popular and published view that Indian 
philosophy is ‘other worldly’, there is detailed and careful 
presentation of what could be considered the two primary 
signs of consciousness, namely (a) generation of meaning 
and its validation, and (b) intensity of experience and 
broadening of its scope through its own transcendence, and
(ii) the discussion on ‘consciousness’ in Indian thought is not 
a word-oriented (namely ‘consciousness’) but an experience- 
oriented task which looks at empirical, experiential, 
epistemological and Ideological facets of consciousness.
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Though in the present approaches to understanding of 
consciousness, some degree of importance is given to epistemology 
and to first-person experience, there is something missing. What 
is missing is an attempt to resist untimely classification of events 
and meanings of ‘consciousness’ under empirical/medical/ 
ordinary and transcendental/psycho-analytic/mystical groups and 
their segregated and non dynamic explanations. To be in the 
context of particular experiences, and to integrate them to a 
transcendence which will least look unfamiliar and ‘other-worldly’, 
cannot be the result of classificatory understanding or solipsistic 
transcendental experiences alone.
First and foremost we need to recognize ‘consciousness’ as a 
complex phenomenon and thereby dissuade ourselves from 
secluded and segregated analysis. The com plexity of 
consciousness looks more and more like the delicate togetherness 
of understand ing  and being. The understanding  of 
‘consciousness’ is more an understanding of its ontology, which 
needs the focus of epistemology to be shifted from normal and 
ordinary experiences, or even abnormal and transcendental 
experiences, to the hohstic definition of the problem, method, 
and goals of enquiry. This would facilitate breaking ‘habitual’ 
ways of event-oriented or object-oriented analysis by experience- 
oriented or first-person-oriented understanding. The categories 
of thinking formed by the analyst and his/her worldview will be 
specific and there will be potential for widening the scope 
of understanding.
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The two questions which are important, if we are ‘really’ 
interested in understanding consciousness are (i) What are we 
really looking at? and (ii) What do we really want to look at? 
Our notions about ‘rea l’, ‘tru th ’ and ‘se lf  have to be 
continuously questioned, but at the same time, integrated with 
personal growth, values, spiritual understanding and self­
exploration.
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Appendix 1
B h a r a t a  e n l i s t s  e ig h t  f u n d a m e n ta l  s th a y ib h a va ,  t h i r t y  t h r e e  
vyabhicaribhava, e igh t satvikabhava a n d  e ig h t rasa a c c o rd in g  to  th e  
sthayibhava:
RASA STHAYIBHAVA
Rati (happiness) Srngara (charm)
Hasa (laughter) Hasya (humour)
^oka (mental pain) Karuna (compassion)
Krodha (anger) Rudra (fury)
Utsaha (e n th u s ia sm ) Vira (h e ro ic )
Bhaya (fear) Bhayanaka (terrfying)
Jugupsa (disgust) Bhibhatsa (despicable)
Vismaya (amazement) A dbhuta (surprise)
The thirty-three vyabhicaribhava (all these are given their corresponding 







Srama (e x h a u s tio n )
Alasya (le th a rg y )
Dainya (pity)
Cinta (anxiety)
Moha (d e lu s io n )

















Amarsa (restrained anger) 
Avahittha (deception)
Ugrata (ferocious)
Mati (analytic understanding) 
Vyadhi (ailment)










Svarabheta (change in the tone of voice)
Vepathu (tremble)
Vaivarnya (change in the color of face)
Asru (teaful)
Pralaya (fainting)
B in d in g  Experiences f o r  a F ir s t -Person  A pproach
Appendix 2
The eight rasadhrsti are:
RASADHRSTI 
Kanta (loving glance)




Karuna (compassionate glance) Karuna
Raudri (ferocious glance) Raudra
Vira (heroic glance) Vira
Bhayanaka (terrifying glance) Bhayanaka
NATURE OF GLANCE
eyebrows moved, glance 
through the sides of the eyes, 
and eyes with an intense 
look, as if drinking in the 
object”
eyelids are contracted one 
after the other, wandering 
pupils”
upper eyelid droops down 
with tears, wandering pupils, 
nose-ends intense”  
both eyelids trem ble, still 
pupils, red and dry eyes, 
strained eyebrow s’'’ 
steady pupils, fully 
opened and glowing eyes, 
ends o f the eyes contracted”  
raised and m otionless eye^ 
lids, restless pupils’*
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Bibhatsa (disgusting glance) Bibhatsa
Adbhuta (surprising glance) Adbhuta
eyelids come together with 
restlessness, unsteady pupils, 
eyeballs at the corners of the 
ey es’"
moist eyes, pupils go in and 
out alternately, eye lashes 
slightly contracted, bright 
corners of the eyes'"'
The twenty-eight bhavadrsti are: 




Kruddha (glance with anger)
Drpta (glance with pride) 
Bhayanvita (glance with fear)
Jugupsita (glance with disgust)
Vismita (glance with surprise)
N atu re o f  G lan ce
fully opened eyes, eyebrows held 
up, pupils in the corners of the 
eyes"*-
slightly contracted pupils which 
are restless, eyelids close 
alternately'*'
drooping upper eyelids, restrained 
movement of pupils, with tears'*'* 
motionless eyelids, dry eyes, agitated 
pupils, bent eyebrows'''  ̂
fully opened eyes and still pupils''*’ 
fully opened eyes, eyeballs standing 
out and agitated'*’ 
contracted eyelids, look away 
from the object, indefinite look^* 
fully open eyelids, steady look to 
a distance, pupils held up'*'̂
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VYABHICARIBHAVADHRSTI""
Sunya (vacant look)
Malina (d ep ressed  look)
Nature of Glance
s te a d y  e y e s ,  but not d e a r ,  lo o k  
vacantly without an object"  
p u p i l s  d i r e c t e d  a w a y  fr o m  th e  
objec t,eye l ids  slightly c losed ,  clear  
c o r n e r s  o f  th e  e y e s ,  t h r o b b in g  
eyelashes'"
pupils directed to a short distance,  
m oist e y es ,  tired eyeballs ,  slightly 
contracted corners o f  the eyes'^ 
e y e la sh es  co m e  together, tired  
pupils, drooping upper eyelids'^'* 
Sankita (glance with suspicion) e y e s  are a l t e r n a te ly  s t e a d y  and
r e s t l e s s ,  turn to w a r d s  th e  s id e s  
o u t w a r d  a nd  u p w a r d ,  a l t e r n a t e  
intense looks and looking a w a y ”  
Mukuja (fully c losed  look) united and throbbing eyelash es ,
resting pupils'^*
A rdh a m u k u !a (h a lf -o p cn ed  look) h a l f - o p e n e d  e y e s  a n d  s l i g h t l y
throbbing, half c lo sed  eyelids^’
Sranta (tired look)
Lajjita (glance with shyness)
Glana ( languid  lo o k)
Jimha ( look ing  distrustfully)
Kuiicita (contracted look)
deeply sunk pupils, move very slowly, 
eyelashes, eyebrows and eyelids appear 
like that of  a blind person'’' 
slightly contracted eyelids,  tired and 
con cea led  pupils, look slowly''' 
e y e l id s  and ey e la sh es  are slightly  
contracted, pupils are well contracted"'  
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Vitarikta (look of indecision) raised  e y e lid s , flushed  and
downward pupils''' 
Abhitapta(extreme painful look) gen tle  m ovem ent o f ey eb a lls ,
upward and downward moving 
eyelids, all the parts of eye indicate 
extreme pain'’̂
corners of the eye are sunk, eyelids 
wide apart and open and close  
frequently, motionless pupils*"’ 
corners of the eyes contracted, 
eyebrows go up and down, and 
sweet look'’'*
eyelids at the corner of the eye are 
slightly contracted, half-closed look, 
pupils are repeatedly turned*'̂  
fully open eyelids and never close, 
unsteady pupils“
occa sio n a l d isturbed and 
undisturbed look, moist and wide 
open eyes, moving pupils'’’ 
steady and drooping eyelid s in
succession''*
extremely unsteady pupils, eyelids 




Vikosa (wide open look) 
Vibhranta (distracted look)
Vipjuta (floating look) 
Trasta (fearful look)
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Madira (intoxicated look) 
is dassiticd  into three kinds such 
as the early (tarunaj, m iddle  





corners of the eye are wide and the 
rest of the eye is contracted, pupil 
move about in a circle™ 
slightly contracted eyelids, unsteady 
pupils^'
pupils move downward and eyelids 
are almost closed’^
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17. prama karanarnpramanarn
S. Kuppuswam i, Sastri (1932). A Primer o f Indian Logic: According to 
Annambhatta's Tarkasarngraha. (Mylapore; Madras Law Journal Press) p. 189
18. Miriyanna, M. (1975). Indian conccption o f  values. (Mysore; Kavyalaya 
Publishers) p. 43
19. caturtha abhinaya upet am laksanavrttito buddaih 
nartanarn natyamityuktarn sa tvatrabhinayo bhavet
K. V asudeva Sastri and G. Nagaraja Rao (1990). (Ed.) Tr. Natya Sastra 
Samgraha. 3“' edition. (Tanjavaur; Saraswati Mahal Library) v o l.l, p. 20 
henceforth denoted as Natya Sastra Samgraha
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20. natyasabdo rase mukhyo rasa abhivyaktikaranarn 
Natya $astra Samgraha: p. 20
21. caturthabhinaya tatra angiko angaidarsito matah /  
vaca viracitah kavyanatakadistu vadkah / /  
aharyo harakeyurakhhadivibhusanam /  
satvikah satvikairbhavaih bhavukena vibhavitah / /
Natya Sastra Sarngraha: p. 20
22. \n vacika abhinaya \s lokadharmidwA s\npn^ \% natyadharmi. In
aharya abhinaya vic&nng of ornam ents is lokadharwi suggesting objects 
by m ere gestures is natyadharmi. In satvika abhinaya sheddingtears is 
lokadharmi and suggesting tears by gesture is natyadharmi.
Natya Sastra Sarngraha: p. 25
23. Sngikarn bhuvanarn yasya vacikarn sarva vangmayarn /  
aharyam candratarati tarn namah satvikarn sivarn / /
Natya Sastra Sarngraha: p. 1
24. The Natya Sastra o f Bharatamuni: Translated into English by a board o f  
scholars. (2000). (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications) 2“' revised edn. p. 528 
henceforth denoted as Natya Sastra
25. rasa iti kah padarthah 
ucyate asvadhyatvat
Tarlekar, G. H. (1991). Studies in the Natya Sastra: With special reference to 
the Sanskrit drama in performance. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass) 2'*'revised 
edn. p. 54 henceforth denoted as Studies in Natya Sastra
26. bhavayanti iti bhavah 
Natya Sastra: p. 86
27. srngara hasya karuna raudra vira bhayanakah/ 
bibhatsa adbuta samjnau cetyastau nStye rasah smrtah / /
Studies in Natya Sastra: p. 56
Bharata talks only about eight rasa. It is Abhinavagupta who introduced the 
ninth santa rasa, and also the m ost im portant rasa, which was essential to 
portray the unique spiritual nature of Buddha. Studies in Natya Sastra. p. 60
28. Translations of the term s are by the author.
29. Natya Sastra: pp. 86-11
30. Three kinds of mada are m entioned according to their intensity.
See Natya Sastra: p. 95
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31. Nafya ^astra: pp. \ 23-\ 26
32. /Vatya &astra Samgraha: pp. 483-491 
NStya ^astra: pp. 118-119





























60. /&(/.■ p .5 10
61. /A/c^.p.511
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73. angena Slaimbayet gitam hastena art barn pradarsayct /  
netrabhyaw darsayet bhavam padabhyam talarnacaret / /  
yato hasta tato drstih yato drstih tato manah /  
yato manah tato bhSvah yato bhavah tato rasah / /
Natya ^astra Samgraha: p. 31
74. Natya ^astra: Chapters.27,34,35
75. /fo<y. p.381
76. /*/■</.■ Chapters.34, 35, pp.514 530
for a detailed description of the classes and kinds of role.
77. /foy, p.376
W ords like ‘Kastaw’iox the pathctic feelings portrayed.
78. Ibid:’p31(>
W ords like ‘aA o 'fo r implying ‘how wonderful’ the portrayal is.
79. /foa-p.375
Apprciation of hum our is implied with smile and laughter; appreciation of 
joy is expressed through horripilation.
80. f t / d  p. 380
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